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ABSTRACT
This paper explores feminist ethical theories in regards to their ability to enrich Shannon
Sullivan’s transactional epistemology (STE) presented in Living Across and Through Skins. The
feminist ethical theories that will be explored within this paper include care ethics, as presented
by Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings, and responsibility ethics, as presented by Margaret Urban
Walker. In order for a theory to enrich STE it must have an understanding of the person and
environments as mutually constitutive of one another and subsequently apply this understanding
to effectively address oppressive attitudes and behaviours, particularly those found in the
application of rigid gender binaries, in a way that aims to dismantle them. Sullivan describes
such an understanding of persons through the notion of “transactional bodies” and asserts that
this understanding is significant to the goal of improving bodily existence. Sullivan places this
goal of improving bodily existence as central to her philosophy, and to any philosophy that
explores corporeal existence. The feminist ethical theory that best addresses the application of
rigid gender binaries and thus contributes to STE’s goal of improving bodily existence will be
best suited for enriching STE.
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This paper will explore how feminist ethical theories operate within the transactional
epistemology developed by Shannon Sullivan in Living Across and Through Skins. Sullivan’s
transactional epistemology (STE) presents a comprehensive way of knowing the world that takes
into account the complexity of the person and the environments that influence the person.
According to STE, we can most accurately understand the world through the mutually
constitutive interaction between individuals and environments. Sullivan, however, notably
characterizes what people often call “interaction” as “transaction”, thus establishing the basis for
STE. It is through an exploration and understanding of transactions that people gain knowledge,
thus allowing for knowledge to be grounded in real lived experiences. It is in this deep
connectedness of knowledge with lived experiences that feminist ethical theories can find
common ground with STE.
This paper will explore the mutual goal that STE and feminist ethical theories share of
improving bodily existence in the world by understanding the world through the multiplicity of
individual lived experiences and the acknowledgement and examination of environments in
which those perspectives have developed (Sullivan, 2001, p. 5). People exist within various
environments with which they continually transact. Understanding how these various
environments influence people is important to understanding how the gender binary is
maintained. And addressing the role and impact of harmful gender binaries is an essential means
for understanding individual lived experiences and moving towards the shared goal of improving
bodily existence in the world, as the application of rigid gender binaries has long been used as a
tool of oppression. I wish to highlight the importance of feminist ethical theories within STE by
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providing an account of how feminist ethical theories, specifically care ethics and an ethics of
responsibility, contribute to STE, particularly in their ability to address rigid gender binaries.
After presenting STE as the basis for this paper’s discussion, I will examine care ethics
and responsibility ethics respectively in relation to STE’s major tenets in order to weigh the
potential of each theory for enriching STE. In order for a theory to enrich STE it must understand
the person and the environments as mutually constitutive of one another and apply this
understanding to effectively address oppressive attitudes and behaviours, particularly those
found in the application of rigid gender binaries, in a way that aims to dismantle them. This act
of effectively addressing gender binaries constitutes action towards improving bodily existence.
Thus, the feminist ethical theory that most accurately follows this path will be best suited for
enriching STE by contributing to the realization of the goal of improving bodily existence.
Section 1: Sullivan’s Transactional Epistemology
In Living Across and Through Skins, Shannon Sullivan draws inspiration from pragmatist
and feminist philosophers to establish her transactional epistemology. To begin, Sullivan draws
her use of the word “transactional” from John Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy which places an
emphasis on the physical body. The body, and thus the individual, can be defined by what
Dewey describes as “transactions” (Sullivan, 2001, p.1). From this account, Sullivan (2001)
seeks to "explore corporeal existence as transactional,” by delving into the complex transactions
that constitute bodily existence (p. 1). For Sullivan, using the notion of transactional bodies as
the basis for her inquiry allows for understanding to be grounded in concrete lived experience, so
as to avoid becoming overly abstract and, thus, risk losing applicability to real life (Sullivan,
2001, p. 4). Wishing to move away from abstract theory, what Sullivan (2001) presents is still
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very much a theory, though one which “returns to concrete bodily life in order to test its fruits in
lived experience.” (p. 4). Such a theory has very much to offer in regards to understanding
human life in a maximally cohesive and intricate manner, a manner that does not attempt to
divide the individual or view them separately from their environments. People exist within
various environments and in order to understand a person we must understand the diverse
influences that these environments have on a person and the influences a person in turn has on
these environments through their transactions. There are three major points essential to
understanding Sullivan’s transactional epistemology (STE) within the context of this paper, and
these include the importance of the concept of “transaction”, a description of bodies as activity
or doing, and the notion of discursivity.
Due to its particular definition and contrast with the word “interaction”, it is important to
note Sullivan’s deliberate choice to use Dewey’s concept of “transaction”. S
 ullivan’s
exploration of transactional bodies provides insight into an understanding of ourselves, the
world, and our place within it. To transact means for something to be exchanged in some manner
in a “back and forth” type of dynamic (Sullivan, 2001, p. 14). The body and its environments are
in the process of constant “mutual influence and impact” and “mutual transformation” of one
another (Sullivan, 2001, p. 1). “Interaction” does not do what is being described here justice as it
cannot provide an accurate picture of the complex and intricate relationship at play (Sullivan,
2001, p. 13). The fundamental concern lies in the fact that “to interact” implies a body and
environments which have developed and formed independently from one another, or in other
words, are ontologically separate from one another, which is not the case (Sullivan, 2001, p. 12).
Rather, taking the notion of exchange into account, “transaction” more fully captures the way a
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body and its environments are entangled with one another in a complex manner by which they
are in constant exchange.
Sullivan describes the individual as a “transactional” body and, in order to understand
what this entails, it helps to take a closer look at what is meant by the use of the word
“transactional”. Transactions occur between our body and our environments, in a way that blurs
the lines between self, other, and environment. To blur the lines is not to lose individual identity,
but simply to understand the complex ways we shape and have been shaped by our environments
and by one another, thus enriching our notion of identity. As Sullivan (2001) quotes Dewey, we
live “as much in process across and ‘through’ skins as in process ‘within skins’” (p. 13). I point
this out simply to highlight the notion that “identity” is not an internal and static construct; rather
it is a process that occurs across transactions as part of a much larger picture that includes our
environments (Sullivan, 2001, p. 13) Once we are able to view ourselves and one another on this
larger scale, then the manifestation of more complex transactions found in social, political, and
ethical matters can be addressed.
An example of these complex transactions can be found in the application of rigid gender
binaries within society. Sullivan (2001) addresses gender binaries as an important site for change
because “current categories of sex and gender are extremely rigid: each member of the binary
pair is defined in sharp opposition to the other” (p. 89). She claims that “the need to rethink
contemporary conceptions of gender, and notions of sex and sexuality that transact with them, is
urgent” because “the binary remains rigid and powerful enough to make life very dangerous for
those who attempt to blur its boundaries.” (Sullivan, 2001, p. 89-90). Gender binaries are rigid in
the way that they are applied. From the moment we are born we are categorized under the binary
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of “boy” or “girl” and become subject to the socialization, restrictions, and potential harms that
follow as a result of being categorized under one of these rigid labels. Once a person is
categorized it is difficult to define oneself outside the limits of this label due to the restrictive and
comprehensive character of such labels. Gender binaries, therefore, can be described as rigid. A
strong understanding of gender binaries requires the intricate transactions that produce them, as
well as the ways gender binaries themselves further influence these transactions, to be taken into
account.
Sullivan (2001) states that “the best way to understand and improve bodily existence is to
concentrate on the environments and situations that effect bodies'' (p. 11). We are as much a
product of the environment as the environment is a product of our existence within it, and
understanding this is essential to the possibility of creating change. As a result, “the best way to
attempt to change the world is to transform a body’s transactions with it” (Sullivan, 2001, p. 11).
Addressing oppressive attitudes and behaviours is a significant way that bodily existence can be
improved, as Sullivan highlights in the need to address the application of rigid gender binaries.
Sullivan (2001) believes that “thinking about the world and the place of bodily existence in it
should be at the heart of philosophy” and that thinking of bodies as transactional will be the best
way to achieve this task (p. 11). This goal or theme of improving bodily existence is one that
connects STE with feminist ethical theories and which makes exploring bodies as transactional
so significant.
Understanding ourselves as “transactional” is significant because it allows for a holistic
understanding of the individual. In absence of this “holistic” understanding, we have many
understandings of persons that artificially separate the person into component parts. These
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understandings of the self attempt to divide and separate different aspects of the self as though
these aspects were ontologically separate pieces, rather than the self being ontologically whole
from the beginning. Understandings of the self that attempt to divide or fragment the self invoke
assumptions that may act as obstacles to understanding bodies in the world. The assumptions that
a transactional understanding overcomes include the dualism of self and world, in addition to the
atomism which follows as a consequence of this dualism (Sullivan, 2001, p. 12). Both of these
assumptions are harmful because they present a fragmented view of ourselves that ignores the
essential roles that others play in shaping the self. These include the cultural, social, and political
meanings that have unquestionably influenced who we are in addition to how we understand
ourselves and the way we transact with others.
To understand how these two assumptions are overcome, I would like to take a moment
to look more closely at the body and the importance of Sullivan’s use of the term “body” in
particular. By “body”, Sullivan refers to the individual as a whole, rather than the body in
isolation or as a material vessel that somehow houses the individual. There are many benefits to
viewing ourselves in terms of “bodies” compared to ways that seek to divide our bodies into
varying parts (such as a mind or a soul) that exist within a body. To overcome this obstacle,
Sullivan uses the word “body” to describe the entirety of a person. By viewing the body as the
person, we can then look at our bodies as an integral part of our environments, and vice versa.
This can be made possible by understanding bodies in terms of activity, that is, in what bodies
do. When we view bodies in terms of activity, this activity is not internal and cut off from our
environments, rather this activity is our transactions with our different environments.

Glover 7

Over time our transactions develop into habits, as “habits are formed in and through an
organism’s transactions with its various environments” (Sullivan, 2001, p. 33-34). Bodies can
thus be understood in terms of collections of actions that form into patterns of behaviour and
patterns of behaviour that naturally form into habits (Sullivan, 2001, p.3). In viewing ourselves
in terms of individual bodies and in terms of what our bodies do, it becomes essential to also
view our environments at the same time, as this is the only space in which our body can act. This
highlights how closely our habits are formed in response to our environments which means that
the key to creating change exists in understanding and changing how these habits are formed.
The first assumption a transactional understanding of the body overcomes is that of the
dualism of self and world, understood through the opposition of “mind versus body”. What a
transactional understanding is able to provide is a holistic account in which all aspects that have
shaped and influenced an individual are acknowledged and taken into account. Since Sullivan’s
notion of a transactional body firmly places the individual within the world, there is no “body”
which appears within the world and then a mind which is separate from this body and untouched
by said world. Other theories have described a mind which exists within a body, as well as a soul
which is contained within or confined to a physical body, or anything else which presents the
individual as fragmented. So rather than viewing ourselves within the confines of the “person in
isolation” (i.e. a mind merely interacting with a body), STE aims to view ourselves as situated
elements of our environments (Sullivan, 2001, p.4). In other words, by moving beyond the mind
versus body dualism, focus can be given to the concrete aspects of how we transact with our
environments.
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STE provides a holistic account of the individual that allows attention to be drawn to the
experienced world, as the “mind marks a particular way for some physical bodies who are
organisms to transact with the world,” (Sullivan, 2001, p. 26). Rather, the mind is the body
insofar as it is inseparable from the body and a necessary part of what it means to be human. In
other words, there is no metaphysically distinct mind to discuss. The mind and all that constitutes
it can instead be viewed as an activity of the body. The mind cannot be viewed in isolation from
the physical body anymore than people can properly be viewed in isolation of the environments
in which we exist. And so an understanding of the individual as a “transactional body”
overcomes the problem of atomism, as we have our own identity, but an identity which is not
separate from the environments in which we exist, and which cannot be understood in isolation
from the environments in which we exist (Sullivan, 2001, p. 19).
From here, we can now move beyond the belief that we are somehow beings separate and
isolated from the world to begin understanding how the world is an important and inseparable
part of who we are. This is significant because understanding the influence of our various
environments as an inseparable part of who we are plays a crucial role in understanding
important issues such as gender and the complex ways that gender roles can be used to restrict
and harm individuals. Rather than gender being intrinsically linked to an individual, STE offers
us a means of understanding gender as culturally and socially situated. In other words, we can
understand gender as shaped, influenced, and perpetrated by current discourse. Sullivan
describes this as the “discursivity” of the body which allows for one to be situated and thus
further overcomes the problem of atomism. As such, the notion of “discursivity” is also essential
to understanding Sullivan’s transactional epistemology. Bodies, and thus their habits, can be
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understood as “discursive”, that is in relation to current discourse. Discourse includes the
traditions, beliefs, and values of a culture and society. We cannot have an understanding of
bodies which is separate from these cultural and social meanings of which they are a part
(Sullivan, 2001, p. 41).
Conceiving of bodies outside of these meanings and contexts, in terms of “pre- or
nondiscursive” bodies, has traditionally been used to justify oppression of one group over
another. This happens when understanding based on a description of bodies that has been
divorced from the cultural, social, and political meanings which have shaped them becomes the
basis for understanding the person as a whole (Sullivan, 2001, p. 41). As Sullivan (2001)
describes, “anatomical differences often have been used to justify the social and political
oppression of some groups over others, such as men over women, white people over people of
colour, the ‘civilized’ European over the native ‘savage’” (p. 41).
Removing the body from the cultural and social meanings which created these oppressive
attitudes or habits further harms the people who are subject to these oppressive attitudes and
habits. Instead of viewing oppressive attitudes and habits as products of our various
environments, they are viewed as products of the body and thus shift blame to the recipients of
these negative attitudes rather than viewing them as the victims that they are. Sullivan (2001)
highlights this in the presence of rigid gender binaries within society that confine and limit one’s
roles within society; as she states, to question and challenge this binary, “is to risk all the
psychological, physical, emotional, financial, and other punishments that are meted out to gender
traitors in society” (p. 89-91). In other words, our bodies cannot be understood outside of the
cultural and social meanings that have shaped them. Discourse shapes our habits for transacting
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with the world, and it is from these habits that oppressive attitudes can develop. And as these
types of habits become rigid and inflexible, this can result in the “enslavement” of an individual
(Sullivan, 2001, p. 33). It becomes essential that we are able to “recognize the discursivity of
gendered bodies not to neglect lived, bodily experience, but precisely so that one might better
understand and slowly transform it” (Sullivan, 2001, p. 63). In other words, if we can understand
ourselves and others as discursive bodies, then we can begin to see how certain habits have been
formed and we can begin to break down our own oppressive attitudes and those of society.
This discourse may place or remove certain pressures on an individual that ultimately
contributes to who the person is as a whole. For example, those categorized by society as
“biologically female” will experience very different transactions with their environments than
those categorized as “biologically male”. Studies have observed adults “transacting” differently
with an infant depending on whether they were told the infant is male or female (Delk, Madden,
Livingston, et. al., 1986). Researchers found that those who were told a child was female
interacted with the child in feminine stereotyped ways and vice versa when told the child was
male (Delk, Madden, Livingston, et. al., 1986). These differences in transactions continue
throughout one’s childhood, into adolescence, throughout the entirety of one’s life, and will
ultimately contribute to the development of different gendered habits in each individual. These
gendered habits will then further reinforce certain attitudes that society holds about men and
women, whether positive or negative.
As a result of the mutual constitution of individuals and their environments, which
includes the current discourse, Sullivan (2001) states that “the best way to attempt to change the
world is to transform a body’s transactions with it” (p. 11). In adopting a view of the self and the
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world that adheres to Sullivan’s theory, we can become more aware of the ways that we are
transacting with our environments and how our environments, which include the current
discourse, influence or affect the ways that we are transacting. This awareness can be applied to
the categorization of individuals within the gender binary as either male or female. If people are
categorized as female, for example, they are expected to transact with their environments in
rather specific and often limited ways. The best way to address gender binaries then is to
transform how we transact in gendered ways.
Sullivan (2001) suggests that this can be done by experiencing certain gendered habits
outside of the types of transactions that have helped to form them (p. 106). This can help us
become particularly aware of and ultimately question the habit. One way we can create change in
the world comes from challenging the gender binary in this way. We can describe this as an
attempt at transforming a body’s transactions with its environments, and thus help contribute to
Sullivan’s goal of changing the world for the better. Since gendered habits have formed through
certain transactions within specific environments or situations, witnessing or experiencing the
performance of these gendered habits outside of the context in which they have been traditionally
formed serves as a powerful way to challenge and question them. When we become more aware
of gendered habits and begin to question and challenge them this serves as an important act of
weakening the application of a rigid gender binary as the line that often harshly divides
“male/masculine” and “female/feminine” will begin to become blurred.
It follows that this breaking down of gender binaries can aid in giving rise to an increased
possibility for change. As Sullivan (2001) states in the beginning of Living Across and Through
Skins, she wishes to “explore corporeal existence as transactional,” and, in the process, explore
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“some of the social, political, ethical, and epistemological implications of transactional bodies.”
(p. 1). This is important, because exploring the implications of transactional bodies in these
various spheres of human life shows how these transactions might be changed in order to affect
positive change on a personal level. It begins with acknowledging the role and impact of gender
binaries on our transactions within these realms. This has the potential to create a “chain
reaction” by means of continual, more conscious, transactions with the world. Change is often
something that occurs slowly over time, but through adopting a view of the world and the
individual as prescribed by STE, we can begin understanding how these changes are possible.
Exploring other areas of thought, such as ethics, within the context of STE encourages us
to question how and what transactions have helped to form these theories that have been widely
accepted and for whom they are beneficial. Sullivan (2001) summarizes the importance of
understanding bodies as transactional to the continual process of change:
holding that bodily activities are shaped by transactions with their environments is
valuable to philosophy in particular, and to life in general, because such an understanding
of bodying encourages people to ask whether, when, how, and for whom those
transactions are beneficial (p. 64).
Asking these sorts of questions encourages greater self-awareness of harmful transactions, such
as those most heavily influenced by gender binaries, and improves our ability to critically
examine those types of transactions. The ability to acknowledge and examine harmful
transactions in day-to-day life creates the potential for increasing the rate at which changes to
these transactions might occur.
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A transactional understanding of the world would require an ethical theory that is not
overly abstract and thus inapplicable to the real lived experience that it addresses. By “overly
abstract” I am referring to ethical theories that move beyond individual experiences in an attempt
to attain objectivity, or a “neutral, ‘God’s eye’ point of view, which feminists have shown to be
covertly masculine” (Sullivan, 2001, p. 5). Moving forward it will remain important to
continually return to lived experiences to test the fruits of the ethical theories to be addressed.
Since gender binaries will be a common theme traced throughout this paper, it will be important
to examine the ways that these ethical theories are influenced by gender binaries and to what
degree they contribute to either maintaining or breaking them down. The result of these inquiries
will reveal which feminist ethical theory is best suited for enriching STE and contributing to the
goal of improving bodily existence in the world.
Section 2: How care ethics can enrich STE
Care ethics first emerged out of Carol Gilligan’s (1982) work as a psychologist studying
morality and moral development, and can be seen as a direct critique of popular developmental
models in psychology at the time which “implicitly adopt[ed] the male life as norm, [and] tried
to fashion women out of a masculine cloth” (pp. 1, 6). Gilligan’s (1982) In a Different Voice:
Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, was concerned in particular with the theory of
moral development posited by Lawrence Kohlberg (p. 18). Kohlberg’s work and his notion of
‘moral maturity’ was “derived from the study of men’s lives and reflects the importance of
individuation in their development” and, therefore, is inapplicable to women and instead
becomes a tool to support the notion of their moral inferiority to men (Gilligan, 1982, p. 17, 18).
In other words, “a problem in theory became cast as a problem in women’s development”
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(Gilligan, 1982, p. 7). “Care thinking” emerged largely in opposition to what Gilligan (1982)
referred to as “justice thinking”, or the type of moral thought favoured by men (p. 164, 167;
Saul, 2003, p. 212).
Care ethics is favourable for the purpose of enriching STE due to its attention to the
existence of gender binaries, the way it views the individual as transactional, and its
acknowledgement of the influence of discourse. Gilligan (1982), through the course of her own
work, developed her theory of “care thinking” as an approach to morality favoured by women (p.
164; Saul, 2003, p. 212). We can see how Gilligan (1982) attempts to address the gender binary
through her belief that this “different voice” she is describing is “characterized not by gender but
theme” and that “its association with women is an empirical observation” (p. 2). She attempts to
address gender binaries by including the experiences of women in theories that are otherwise
based solely on specific men and their experiences, and then passed off as “gender neutral”
(Gilligan, 1982, p. 6). This acknowledgment of the gender binary is an important feature of care
ethics as it moves moral theory a step away from those theories that use “male as norm” then
present them as “gender neutral”. For this reason, care ethics can find some common ground
with STE, in terms of its concerns regarding gender.
Care ethics also views people in a way that supports Sullivan’s transactional
understanding of individuals. Carol Gilligan (1982) describes the development of female gender
identity as an “ongoing process of attachment that creates and sustains the human community”
(p. 156). Jennifer Saul, on Gilligan’s care ethics, explains that “women view themselves
primarily as situated in a complex web of interrelationships, [and] emphasize particular contexts
over general principles” (Saul, 2003, p. 213). We can see here how care ethics might be relevant
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to STE as it describes the individual as “situated in a complex web of interrelationships”, thus
taking into account the mutually constitutive or “transactional” nature of our existence. By
situating the individual and placing an emphasis on the role of community and “particular
contexts over general principles,” care ethics continues to present ideas shared by STE by taking
the environments and others into account. Within ethics, the task of “situating” oneself becomes
imperative because “more philosophers are in the plane of morality, not hovering above it or
perched outside it,” and as such, ethical theories must be understood as emerging from a
“particular social place” (Walker, p. 26, 27).
Lastly, care ethics also takes the discursivity of individuals into account. As necessarily
situated, we must be situated within a certain discourse, which means that in order to understand
someone’s situation or perspective we must first understand their actions as influenced by the
customs, beliefs, and traditions of the community in which they find themselves. By “situating”
ourselves, we are acknowledging that the culture and society in which we live plays an integral
part in who we are. In other words, we are part of many different communities and our
“transactions” within these communities. Care ethics views individuals as “fundamentally
interdependent” in that we continually require care from others throughout our lives in order to
flourish (Saul, 2003, p. 214). This “interdependence” can be compared to a major belief of STE:
we do not exist nor can we be understood in isolation from one another. It is in this notion of
“interdependence” that we can see the role of community emerge. If all humans are
interdependent in varying ways, then every individual exists as a member of a community or
communities. We cannot be understood in isolation, just as we do not exist in isolation from
other humans. The community in which we live exists as a necessary part of our environments
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and as such plays an essential role in who we are. As we go on, we will continue to see how
these similarities can be used to enrich STE.
Before exploring how these similarities can enrich STE, we will first contrast care ethics
with traditional ethical theories to demonstrate the shortcomings of traditional ethical theories
within STE and to highlight the strengths of care ethics for enriching STE. In her article, The
revolutionary fact of compassion: William James, Buddhism, and the feminist ethics of care,
Cathryn Bailey (2012) describes “traditional ethical theories” as favouring “values associated
with men, such as individualistic autonomy and abstract justice” (p. 184). These types of theories
have been criticized by feminists for the fact that they often “obscure the particularity of moral
actors and relations by emphasizing universality, sameness, and repeatability, excluding or
regimenting emotional experience” (Walker, p. 51). “Traditional” ethical theories fail to account
for the reality of different individual experiences and instead “stem in part from the assumption
that there is a single mode of social experience and interpretation” and that “single mode” comes
from the lives of certain men (Gilligan, 1982, p. 173). Traditional ethical theories, therefore, are
harmful within STE and can be contrasted with care ethics on three particular grounds: the harms
and limits of attempting to establish an objective moral theory, the characteristics of the moral
agent, and the role of reason versus emotions in addressing moral dilemmas.
Objectivity attempts to reach an understanding of the world that is not influenced by
human experience or emotion. Since all understandings of the world emerge from individual
perspectives and experiences such a task is impossible to achieve. Many standard ethical theories
relied on what Gilligan referred to as “justice thinking”, which emphasizes objectivity, universal
principles, impartiality, reason, and rights (Saul, 2003, p. 210). Due to the fact that each person
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employing “justice thinking” would necessarily be doing so from their own limited perspective
which would have been shaped and influenced by their transactions with their environments,
such “objective” and “impartial” ideas are impossible to reach in reality. There can be no "God's
eye perspective" of understanding a person’s actions. Relying on a “supposedly universal list of
moral directives” becomes inaccurate and insincere on the part of the proponents of such theories
(Bailey, 2012, p. 191). There is no “objective and universalizable” account of what actions are
right or wrong, or when and why they are right or wrong because our actions are always
influenced by the time and place in which they are occurring. What action might be wrong in one
situation could be right in another; in other words, there are simply too many “grey areas” and
objectivity lacks the perspective to address them.
With this lack of perspective, traditional ethical theories have potential for harm in the
form of oppression through gender and other biases (Walker, p. 51). The notion of “objective and
universally grounded moral theories,” which characterize standard moral philosophies
“have...been used as instruments of oppression and exclusion.” (Bailey, 2012, p. 184). Women
have been “carefully socialized into their feminine roles” by society, a fact that is often ignored
by traditional moral theorists who, instead of suggesting that women should be afforded the same
opportunities to develop their capacities as men, would rather claim that women simply don’t
have those capacities (Saul, 2003, p. 200-202). Care ethics acknowledges that these differences
between men and women are due to their gendered “transactions” with the world rather than an
innate characteristic found in the hypothetical “nondiscursive body”, that STE rejects (Gilligan,
1982, p. 2).
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Accounts of what is right or wrong, or good or bad, are not objective and universally
grounded, but “rather [right and wrong, good and bad] emerge from our experience and are to be
transformed by use,” which is the basis on which an ethics of care operates (Bailey, 2012, p.
191).What is right or wrong can be revealed only when environments, including the current
discourse within those environments, are used as the backdrop for such inquiries. It is only
through such a practice that ethics can take on any sort of valuable meaning and provide practical
advice. Traditional ethical theories, “prescribe the representation of morality as a compact,
propositionally codifiable, impersonally action-guiding code within an agent,” that “demotes a
great deal of what is known, felt, and acted out in moral relations to ‘nonmoral’--merely factual
or collateral--information” (Walker, 1998, p. 7, 8). Essentially, care ethics allows for the
transactional and discursive aspects of existence to be included in its analysis of ethical problems
on a situation by situation basis.
Care ethics confronts objectivity by positing a theory that attempts to explain the reality
of morality found in real lived experiences. Nel Noddings (2013), who helped to develop an
ethics of care out of Gilligan’s initial work, states, “if a substantial segment of humankind
approaches moral problems through a consideration of the concrete elements of situations and a
regard for themselves as caring, then perhaps an attempt should be made the enlighten the study
of morality in this alternative mode” (p. 28). This involves viewing the individual within their
various environments. So where other ethical theories have failed to view the individual as
inseparable from their environment and the current discourse, care ethics does not. Since care
ethics takes into account the transient nature of existence and the need to assess each moral
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decision individually within its particular context, it can be said to reject objectivity and thus
align with STE’s major tenets.
Within traditional ethical theories that aim to be objective, the type of moral agent that
must be posited is completely incompatible with STE’s major tenets. Ethical theories that
prioritize “justice thinking” view “moral agents as autonomous individuals rather than beings
thoroughly enmeshed in connections with and dependencies on others” (Saul, 2003, p. 213).
These kinds of ethical theories, therefore, cannot align with the idea of the body as transactional
and discursive. This can become harmful because it removes the moral agent from their
environments, and in doing so, misses many variables necessary for making a fair moral
judgement or decision. In addition to this, ethical theories have traditionally pushed the primacy
of reason over emotion in making judgements and aiming for “mathematical type certainty”.
Again this is not cohesive with STE because it removes the need for context that transactions and
discourse provide. It would follow then that standard ethical theories are insufficient and, thus, a
different ethical theory is needed that will work in greater unity with the major tenets of STE.
In contrast, care ethics provides better means for viewing the “transactional body” within
the realm of ethics because it provides an account of ethics which is applicable to STE and thus
posits a much more favourable moral agent than traditional ethical theories. Care ethics has the
potential to create a move towards positive change by questioning and rejecting the views found
in traditional “masculinist” ethical theories that “ignore or degenerate the role of emotion in
knowing and interacting with the world” (Bailey, 2012, p. 195). And in doing so, Noddings
(2013) explains that a difficulty arises when we approach “morality or ethical behaviour from a
rational-cognitive approach”, because “we fail to share with each other the feelings, the conflicts,
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the hopes and ideas that influence our eventual choices” (p. 8).The way that we think and feel
can be described as an aspect of how we transact, because STE holds hope for potential positive
change, it would follow that a theory of ethics which takes into account these transactions could
help to enrich STE.
The role of reason versus emotion has long been debated within ethics as traditional
ethical theories have prized reason as the epitome of what it means to be human; what separates
us from other living organisms. In doing so, a large portion of human experiences have been
ignored and shut off as unimportant. It is here in ethics, and in philosophy in general, that we can
identify the reason versus emotion dualism that has not only prized reason as the only means
capable of examining ethical problems, but has also been used as a means of oppression against
women. This dichotomy links directly to gender binaries. Reason has been associated positively
with men, as a means of explaining why there have historically been more male thinkers in
academia for example. Seemingly only men act in accordance with their reason and only reason
is needed to be a good thinker. While emotions have been negatively associated with women, as
an attempt to discourage women from becoming such thinkers. Supposedly to think in a way that
utilizes emotion in any capacity is to be a poor thinker. This either/or condition of the reason
versus emotions dichotomy, in which people are described as applying only reason or only
emotion while thinking, is a rigid and fragmented way to view thought processes. This
dichotomy links directly to gender binaries because it is rigidly applied to different people based
on the gender society has categorized that person as.
Care ethics addresses the reason versus emotion problem by introducing caring as a real
means of addressing ethical problems. Instead of favouring reason or emotions, care ethics takes
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an important step towards dismantling this dichotomy by acknowledging the need for reason and
emotions to work together and inform one another. Since caring has long been viewed as a duty
for women to concern themselves with inside the home it has been viewed as unimportant or
unworthy of examination. Caring has largely been associated with women due to the fact that the
act of caring about someone often involves emotional labour. Care ethics gives attention to this
aspect of bodily experience found in our emotions, thus presenting emotions as capable of
playing an important role within ethics. In addressing this reason versus emotions dichotomy,
care ethics is taking an important step towards addressing the gender binaries that the dichotomy
reinforces.
Care ethics is important to STE because it provides the means for not only viewing
individuals within the realm of ethics in such a way that is consistent with STE, but which also
provides potential for mediating these harms. Sullivan (2001) points towards the need for
different areas of thought to come together so as to enrich one another, which is evident through
her own use of “cross-fertilizing of pragmatism and feminism, along with phenomenological and
genealogical philosophy” to advance philosophy in a positive direction (p. 170). So it would be
consistent with Sullivan’s beliefs that there is much to be learned by “cross-fertilizing” different
areas of thought to arrive at her goal of improving transactions. Improving transactions through
addressing the existence of rigid gender binaries is an important part of this.
Where traditional ethical theories relied on the experiences of men, care ethics brings
forward experiences of women as an equally important part of moral theorizing. In doing so, care
ethics allow for us to experience gendered habits (i.e. how women assess moral problems) as a
legitimate voice, thus, allowing a theory to be built that relies on the experiences of women. This
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is an important step forward in terms of improving human transactions because it legitimizes the
experiences and voices of at least some women in an area of thought that has otherwise been
dominated by men’s experiences and voices. In addition, the new legitimization of experiences
and voices of women works to further challenge gender binaries by utilizing traditional feminine
roles in a non-traditional way. The gendered habit of caring, which has long been a “woman’s
labour”, is being expressed outside of the transactions that had originally formed them, namely
performing caring labour in the home. Care ethics has instead presented caring as an ethical
standpoint, thus taking it beyond the act of caring for one’s family and home out of necessity.
The experience of the gendered habit of caring outside of the transactions that had formed it has
certainly caused many to become aware of and question the absence of such experiences within
the field of ethics up to that point.
Care ethics is important in STE because it examines transactional bodies as moral agents
through an ethics that is consistent with STE’s ideas. Viewing bodies within an ethical discourse
can provide not only a deeper understanding of the importance of understanding bodies as
transactional and discursive, but a demonstration of the importance of STE as a theory in
general. In addition, we can consider the importance it holds for moving beyond harmful and
oppressive attitudes that opposing theories may perpetrate. Through care ethics, a more
comprehensive and holistic account of the individual is developed because an ethics of care takes
into account the context of each situation in question, including “the participants, their feelings,
needs, impressions, and so on” (Nodding, 2013, p. 3). Much like STE moves attention to more
productive concerns (by moving past the mind-body dualism), so too does an ethics of care move
attention to more productive concerns by moving past the reason versus emotion dualism within
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ethics or the alleged need for an objective theory. These ‘more productive concerns’ include
oppressive attitudes perpetrated by the opposing theories and provide support for Sullivan’s
ultimate goal of enhancing bodily existence.
Section 3: How care ethics gave rise to responsibility ethics
We can now introduce responsibility ethics as a yet more favourable framework for
replacing ‘justice thinking’ styles of ethics. Responsibility ethics is born out of care ethics in that
it takes into account the notion of caring; however, it looks beyond the mother-child relationship
as the epitome of a caring relationship capable of representing all humans. Instead it takes this
notion of “caring for one another” and expands it. Margaret Urban Walker’s
expressive-collaborative model of responsibility ethics posits that when one is caring for another,
that person in some sense has a responsibility to the person for whom they are caring (Walker,
1998, p. 78). It is this notion of “responsibility” that is of greatest importance because people do
not only have responsibilities to those for whom they care, but they also have responsibilities to
those who care for them, we have responsibilities to our community, even those members of our
community with whom we lack any direct relationship. This is important because responsibility
implies a sense of duty and accountability. In other words, we do not necessarily have to care
about someone else in order to have some sort of responsibility towards them. "Responsibility”
does not do away with the notion of caring and rather caring becomes but one example of a
responsibility we might have towards another (Walker, 1998, p. 108).
Care ethics historically gave rise to responsibility ethics in order to limit the
overemphasis care ethics places on the role and importance of a maternal voice (as a voice for all
women) which provides a limited and narrow view of ethics. While the maternal voice certainly
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provides some important insights that are helpful to STE, using it as a basis for a complete
ethical theory loses sight of STE’s goal of addressing the gender binary by looking through too
narrow of a lens. An ethics of responsibility, however, is able to continue from where care ethics
was incomplete, simply by examining further what is at the root of “caring”. When we care for
someone, in some sense we also have a responsibility to them. While caring can certainly play an
important role in responsibility, it is not a prerequisite for that responsibility to exist. We may not
automatically care in a real and concrete way about those people we have never met, or for such
an abstraction as “humanity as a whole”, but we certainly have a responsibility towards these
people. We have a responsibility to not cause harm to others and if we are able to positively
influence or affect others in some sort of capacity then we have a responsibility to do so. It is in
this responsibility that we can find more solid ground to work from than we could with care
ethics.
Care ethics brings us in the right direction in that we are moving past the “masculinist”
views of traditional ethical theories and thus it appears suitable for moving towards the goal of
improving transactions. Sullivan, however, posits that rigid gender binaries should receive urgent
attention and should remain an important point for these changes. While care ethics does move
us a step into the right direction in the sense that it is “testing” gendered ways of acting and
thinking by bringing the perspectives and experiences of women from the private sphere to the
public sphere, thus challenging the dominant masculinist perspectives, it does fall short in some
important ways. Care ethics challenges gendered perspectives, but does so by positing female
gendered perspectives. Replacing one gendered moral theory with another gendered moral theory
does not address this issue at the source which is the rigid gender binaries. So while care ethics
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is a promising contributor to STE’s goal of addressing gender binaries, there are various flaws it
possesses which limit its effectiveness for breaking these gender binaries down and, thus, for
enriching STE.
While concern has been raised in regards to “the authority of some men to represent
‘people’,” the same criticism can be raised about “the authority of some women to represent
‘women’” (Walker, 1998, p. 24). Many feminists have critiqued care ethics because it places an
over-emphasis on the role and the importance of a particular type of maternal voice as a voice for
all women, and as a voice which all people should listen to as a moral authority. It makes various
assumptions, including the assumptions that (1) there is only one single maternal voice
representative of all mothers, (2) that all women possess a maternal voice, and that (3) that
maternal voice is the same for every woman across every period of time, across every culture,
and across every individual situation regardless if she is a mother or not (Saul, 2003, p. 216,
Walker, 1998, p. 57). Beyond all, it assumes that the maternal voice is one which should be
valued more than any other, so much so that it is capable of functioning as a source of moral
authority for everyone.
Other theorists, including Walker (1998) are critical of care ethics, as she states care
ethics “valorizes stereotypes of bottomless feminine nurturance and self-sacrifice that continue to
haunt women while politically disempowering and personally exhausting them,” (p. 108). While
care ethics does t ake into account the changing position and situation of those that it is assessing,
it does so from the single fixed perspective of a maternal voice that attempts to understand all
moral situations in terms of caring. In addition, this single fixed perspective is one that is harmful
to women since it perpetuates oppressive stereotypes of what it means to be a woman. Women’s
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bodily existence extends far past the limiting role of caretaker, and in fact, may not even include
this role at all. As Walker (1998) notes, “a care ‘ethic’ can look like the lamentable
internalization of an oppressively servile social role” (p. 108).
A theory of ethics that situates itself, not only as a fixed perspective, but as a fixed highly
rigid gendered perspective could never be sufficient to truly enrich STE. Sullivan focuses on the
changing nature of the individual through her emphasis and focus on the transactional and
discursive nature of the body. Just as standard ethical theories fall short due, in part, to their
limited and fixed perspective, care ethics falls short for this same reason. In addition, Sullivan
has made it clear that in order to improve human transactions, an essential step must include the
move away from rigid gender binaries. Care ethics cannot support this goal of STE in a truly
meaningful way because care ethics essentially rests upon a single fixed perspective and because
this perspective is a rigid gendered perspective that perpetuates harmful stereotypes of women,
both of these reasons make care ethics fundamentally incompatible with STE as a whole.
A meaningful point that care ethics and responsibility ethics highlight is the application
of morality to the supposedly “private sphere” of life. While we abandon care ethics going
forward, it has certainly brought us a step in the appropriate direction. One major sense in which
traditional ethical theories have been masculinist is in the way they only applied morality within
the “public sphere” of life. This can be seen as a result of a majority of theorists being men who
often had wives at home taking care of the family and other private matters. Since this aspect of
life was left for the women to manage it was deemed unimportant and low-ranking on the list of
things worth discussing, thus leaving the private sphere of life unfit for philosophical discussion
(Saul, 2003, p. 213-214). In addition, avoiding such discussions allowed them to avoid truly
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noticing and examining women’s position in society and was thus “important to preserving the
subordination of women,” (Saul, 2003, p. 214). Theories were constructed to make sense only if
people were “autonomous rather than fundamentally interdependent,” and so women’s position
in society was often at odds with these theories (Saul, 2003, p. 214). In other words, the
avoidance of applying theory to the “private sphere” works to “keep some people and what
happens to them outside the view of some authoritative community of mutual moral accounting”
(Walker, 1998, p. 172).
An example of avoidance to address the private sphere of life, which functioned to
maintain women’s position in society second to men, can be found in the application of laws
regarding rape. Rape laws have been applied differently depending on whether the rape occured
within the “private sphere”, involving a husband and a wife, or outside of this sphere, involving a
man and a woman who do not know one another (Walker, 1998, p. 173). Prejudices like these
become “culturally normative” in that the prejudices themselves are not questioned or
deliberated upon, so “it feels like business as usual” (Walker, 1998, p. 181). Bringing attention to
the private sphere of life and examining it as it deserves to be is an important way that feminist
ethical theories can be used to enrich STE and help to further Sullivan’s goal of addressing
oppressive attitudes and behaviour. Where care ethics fails to fully address this issue due to it
functioning within the gender binary, responsibility ethics offers a means past these
shortcomings.
In order for transformation and change to occur, the categorization of rigidly gendered
habits must be changed. Any theory that operates within these “rigid gender binaries” will only
contribute to the continuation of harmful gendered transactions and stereotypes and, thus,
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oppressive attitudes and behaviours. As Sullivan (2001) states, “to eliminate [old habits and
customs] without creating new ones is to ensure that only the old habits and customs are
available to fill their own place” (p. 95). If the habits that traditional ethical theories have helped
to create are to be transformed or changed, there must be some other structure for discussing
ethics that can replace it. That structure cannot be found in care ethics because care ethics is
merely replacing one gendered way of thinking with another gendered way of thinking. So due to
the fact that care theory relies very heavily on favouring the maternal voice and perpetuates the
binary association of women with parenting it is hardly a satisfactory replacement. This is where
we can begin to see the need and benefit of turning entirely away from a theory of ethics which
is overly focused on one perspective, especially a gendered perspective, whether implicitly or
explicitly.
Responsibility ethics goes beyond the gendered perspective found in justice style ethics
in that it is not limited by a male-dominated perspective. By “male-dominated perspective” I do
not mean a perspective that is innately male, or a perspective that is held by all male individuals,
only that these perspectives are heavily influenced and informed by the privileged positions and
experiences males are often afforded in society, as all major theorists have been male. It might
help to look more closely at what makes a perspective or habit “gendered”. It certainly is not the
mere nature of being classified as male at birth, but rather a by-product of the different
experiences, transactions, and learned habits that such authors confront and learn as a
consequence of being assigned male. While there may prove to be subtle differences based on
sex, “the size and the significance of those biological differences will depend, in every single
instance, on the situational context in which women and men live their lives” (Bem, 2007, p.
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141). It is in the way in which children are raised and taught to transact with others that shape
these gendered habits. Since each one of us must think from our own situated perspective, it can
be difficult to think beyond or outside of our own gendered perspectives as is evident with
traditional ethical theories including care ethics. However, becoming aware of these
perspectives, as responsibility ethics attempts to do, can help to mediate them.
In addition to the concern of its limits, care ethics also loses some of its traction when
taking a deeper look at how the term “care” itself is defined. It is unclear who exactly we should
be caring for and who should be caring for us. Noddings (2013) defines caring as involving an
encounter or sets of encounters “characterized by direct attention and response”, which is to say,
“it involves the establishment of a caring relation, person-to-person contact of some sort” (p.
153). This requirement of a direct connection between carer and cared-for raises the concern as
to who one is in fact obligated to care about beyond such relationships, for example, larger
obligations to people we will never meet, such is the case with massive environmental pollution
or the use of nuclear weapons (Card, 2002, p. 151). Noddings (2013) does allow for the notion of
“caring about” (in contrast to “caring for”), though this is vaguely defined as varying from
simply “expressing concern” without acting on that concern, to perhaps “making a donation to a
charitable organization” (p. 162). While it is true that we might “care about” a problem, this does
not fully capture what our obligations or responsibilities to act may entail. Perhaps we should be
obligated to care about these problems, but this does not really tell us very much in terms of
moral actions or duties. So in addition to its limited perspective, care ethics is further limited in
the scope of its applicability. Within STE, it becomes clear that we are part of many different
communities or environments on many different scales, and we transact with each of those
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environments in different ways, and so one holds a variety of different responsibilities within
each of these communities or environments.
There are many individuals who may influence or have responsibilities regarding us and
whom we may also influence and hold responsibilities regarding, and yet we may never actually
physically encounter each other. Care ethics could not adequately account for these transactions
since it involves some sort of connection between the carer and the cared for or simply the notion
of caring about without any sort of action. It does not follow that we have no more than an
obligation to “care about” these individuals in an abstract sense, rather we have a responsibility
to these individuals to act regardless if we “care about” them or not. Our obligation is in taking
responsibility, on an individual and collective scale, for human pain and suffering in the world in
the form of action. What these responsibilities look like will differ from person to person and
will often be limited to a person’s community and the things that they can do at that moment.
These actions could be as simple as questioning a sexist comment someone makes to something
more involved such as volunteering one’s time for a local cause. There are many opportunities,
both large and small, that arise for a person to act on and thus to take on the responsibility of
improving the world for one another.
The idea that we hold responsibilities for one another is not a new idea within ethics.
Walker (1998) claims that “it has been revealing to see which-- or better, whose-- responsibilities
are spotlighted as representative of ‘moral obligations,’ and which [whose] do not show up at
all” (p. 77). Responsibilities have always had a role in ethics; however, it is those responsibilities
that men within the public sphere hold that are seen as representative of “moral obligations” as a
whole, while those responsibilities that we see in the private sphere of life that involve women’s
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responsibilities to her family and within her home (as prescribed by society) have long been
ignored and essentially seen as irrelevant within morality. The problem with this is that
predominantly “men’s responsibilities” are not representative of a large majority of people,
including women and other marginalized groups. This same sort of problem is evident within
care ethics which views responsibility through “the lens of ‘care’” and thus focuses solely on
caretaking responsibilities (Walker, 1998, p. 78). In the face of “the distribution of caring labours
disproportionately to women in our society, more disproportionately still to women who are
relatively poor and nonwhite,” care ethics provides us with an ethics that does not apply well to a
large majority of people and circumstances (Walker, 1998, p. 78). This is significant because “if
gender is a feature of status revealed in who gets to do what to whom, it also shows in who is
expected or permitted to do what to whom.” (Walker, p. 78).
Walker (1998) notes that “gender partly consists in distinct assignments and assumptions
of responsibility, and attracts them” (p. 78). These responsibilities, however, can reach beyond
“caring” to provide a more complete picture of human ethics. Responsibilities are not only to
others, but also to oneself, to one’s community, and to humanity as a whole. As a result,
responsibility ethics is able to take those things within care ethics that showed the most promise
and build upon them in a manner that will provide a more applicable theory that is more in tune
with STE. This is possible because the underlying notion of “caring” is the idea that we have
responsibilities to ourselves and to others. Therefore, focusing on responsibilities in general,
rather than only through the lens of caring and the maternal voice, a greater ethical scope is able
to be established.
Section 4: How responsibility ethics will serve STE better than care ethics
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In contrast to the limited scope of action prescribed by caring, Walker (1998) presents
responsibility as a practice that is realized through action and engagement (p. 60). Walker (1998)
describes responsibility in terms of practices and so through allotting and accepting
responsibility there is a sense in which we are required to act or “practice” responsibility (p. 94).
We can see how the practice of responsibility is action-oriented through the examples of things
that we can be responsible for, including “specific tasks or goals, roles with discretionary
powers, acts and failures to act, outcomes and upshots of actions, contributions to outcomes that
are not ours alone, and attitudes, habits, and traits” (p. 94). In accepting responsibility, for
performing a certain gendered habit for example, one is acknowledging the need for change and,
thus, must act in a way that reflects having taken responsibility for such a habit. It becomes
apparent that the language of “caring” is not extensive enough to encompass the abundant and
intricate types of responsibilities found within and across individuals and their communities. We
can look again to Walker (1998) who puts it succinctly, “I prefer the more capacious language of
responsibility as a conceptual framework for ethics; it invites us to follow the trails of people’s
diverse responsibilities through different domains” (p. 78).
Sullivan’s transactional epistemology defines bodies in terms of their actions, so an ethics
that is focused on the practice of allotting and accepting responsibilities will serve STE better
than an ethics that places a narrow focus on the action of caring. Caring for another can exist as a
general feeling of “caring about” them, which would not necessitate action as we can care about
something or someone without acting on that feeling. And when caring can be seen in terms of
action, these actions are often narrow in scope due to the fact that caring has long been a
gendered action. As Walker (1998) states, “while caring is fundamental, the amount and degree
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to which it is taken up is largely based on gender” (p. 78). We can see this in the way that
“gender partly consists in distinct assignments and assumptions of responsibility,” as caring
becomes but one type of responsibility largely assigned and assumed by women (Walker, 1998,
p. 78).
Within Walker’s expressive-collaborative model of responsibility ethics, the goal is to
uncover what morality is and what it is for by looking at “moral life as a continuing negotiation
among people, a practice of mutually allotting, assuming, or deflecting responsibilities of
important kinds, and understanding the implications of doing so.” (Walker, 1998, p. 60)
Collaboration is a necessary aspect of action when considering ethical problems. Walker (1998)
notes that all moral agents are “situated in (typically multiple, overlapping) epistemic
communities,” and “it is communities, not individuals, that maintain the resources for acquiring
and certifying knowledge,” (p. 57). Walker’s (1998) expressive-collaborative model looks at
how moral knowledge is “produced and sustained within communities,” (p. 59). In this way,
actions are evaluated based not only on the people directly involved, but also on how those
actions fit within and are understood by the community as a whole.
As Claudia Card (2002) states about Walker’s responsibility ethics, “we have
responsibilities regarding many people...with whom either we do not share moral understandings
or it is unclear what moral understandings we share” (p. 150). This means that we will not
always find agreement between or across communities in terms of what is right or wrong, so
while we may not share moral understanding with one another, there will be responsibilities on
which we can agree to, such as the responsibility “not to poison [other communities’] water, soil,
and air” (Card, 2002, p. 150). Relationships within an ethics of responsibility therefore are
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coherent with STE’s transactional and discursive body in the way that responsibility ethics
understands the individual as enmeshed within a complex array of relationships across multiple
communities and also the importance of taking this point into consideration if we are to truly
understand the morality of an action or actions as they must be understood in relation to the
moral understandings of the community in which they arose. This is important because it
acknowledges the impossibility of establishing an objective account of morals, but rather finds
common ground between individuals, communities, and cultures in terms of responsibilities we
hold to one another.
In addition, an ethics of responsibility helps to enrich STE by addressing moral problems
in such a way that mediates for gender differences. While traditional ethical theories are more
applicable to the “public sphere” of life, not to mention men’s experience of the “public space”,
and care ethics focuses more closely on the “private sphere” of life from the woman's
perspective, responsibility ethics is applicable across both these spheres of life and across
gender. As Walker (1998) notes, “a lot of what we need in order to understand specifically moral
judgements or principles goes beyond specifically moral matters. We need to understand a social
world. ” (p. 203) Therefore, the social world in its entirety, including both private and public
spheres of life, must be examined. Responsibility ethics does not favour a particular experience
when considering or explaining ethical problems, but rather allows the person or people and
environments to set the stage for inquiry. This is important if we are to move past rigid gender
binaries and understand individuals within the contexts that helped to establish their habits and
styles of acting. When working alongside STE, an ethics of responsibility can help to turn the
“causal arrow” around so that instead of blaming one’s classification as a particular gender, race,
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or class for one’s actions, we can uncover how one’s various environments have influenced these
actions. Then we can begin to move beyond the confines of such harmful labels and stereotypes.
Responsibility ethics moves past the problem of individual responsibility to encompass
group and collective responsibility, which is also cohesive with STE in that a person cannot be
viewed in isolation from their environments and those around them. There is difficulty in doing
this, however, as it does involve the act of balancing responsibility between the individual as
well as the social structures which have influenced that individual. By placing a greater focus on
individual relationships, as care ethics tends to do, the influence of our environments and
community tends to fall into the background. While placing greater focus on the environment
might cause the role of individual agency to instead fall into the background. A person must
remain responsible for their actions and the choices that they have made, while at the same time
acknowledging the role and influence that environments may have played in making those
choices.
Acknowledging the role of a person’s various environments in their choices and actions
is not to remove responsibility from that person, but simply to gain a deeper understanding of
that person and their individual situation. This can help us to recognize and address issues as
they arise and help to mediate harmful stereotypes of people. If people within a poorer
community are stealing it might be easy for others to stereotype those people as untrustworthy
and weak-willed. These people are still responsible for their actions and should be held
accountable; however, by examining the influence of the environments in which they made the
decision to steal, it could be revealed that there are not enough social resources available and
something should also be done about this lack of resources. This example shows how individual
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responsibility should exist alongside social responsibility and how understanding the two
together can begin to move us beyond the careless and uncritical act of stereotyping people.
An ethics of responsibility takes into account our interconnectedness with others and the
environments in which we exist. This is where responsibility ethics answers with a much broader
and encompassing perspective that acknowledges the presence of different points-of-view and
the ways that our position in the world and to one another can affect how we view ethical
responsibility. Walker (1998) states that “an expressive-collaborative model looks at moral life
as a continuing negotiation among people, a practice of mutually allotting, assuming, or
deflecting responsibilities of important kinds, and understanding the implications of doing so” (p.
60). It acknowledges the historical and social context that we live in and makes judgements
within this context and allows for disagreements without compromising respect and
responsibility towards others.
Responsibility ethics supports STE’s notion of discursive and transactional bodies by
acknowledging the continuously changing nature of human life and the need to take the
environments into account. Responsibility ethics situates the individual in a way that previous
ethical theories have not been successfully able to do and can therefore help to mediate the
concern about gender binaries. The outcome of rigid gender binaries, expressed in gendered
performances and prejudiced and oppressive actions and attitudes, can become something that
we take collective responsibility for perpetrating. While both traditional ethics and care ethics
have seemed to posit a “pre- or nondiscursive body” in the ways that they both view gender
differences as inherent differences linked to one’s sex rather than differences of social and
cultural influence, responsibility ethics unequivocally posits a discursive body. Responsibility
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ethics, therefore, is able to enrich STE by providing a framework for evaluating human actions
that can work alongside STE in hopes of challenging rigid gender binaries. Furthermore,
responsibility ethics helps to provide us with the tools to understand and respect when others are
testing gendered habits outside of the contexts that formed them.
Responsibility ethics is active and progressive in that it allows us to hold ourselves, as
well as others, accountable for actions and attitudes. In regard to accountability, Walker (1998)
notes that
Practices of holding each other responsible do have a fundamental and critical role in
trying to secure certain states of affairs open to impact by human attention and effort,
especially those consisting in or bearing on harms and benefits to other people (or
beings). (p. 93).
The practice of holding one another accountable, therefore, provides us with a greater potential
for changing oppressive attitudes than did previous theories. Sullivan (2001) explains how
change can be made possible “through the effects of many…local and minor alterations of the
habits that produce a culture’s gender constructs...the reconfiguration of a culture’s gender
categories can begin.” (p. 107) Utilizing responsibility ethics in reply to gender constructs is an
important step to beginning the process of drawing our attention towards the existence of these
constructs and to those people they may harm or benefit, thus opening the possibility for
criticism and effort towards change.
These small changes towards the improvement of transactions in the world can occur
when certain gendered habits are “tested” outside of the context that formed them. Sullivan
(2001) provides the example of the “woman philosopher” (p. 105-6) who must learn to combine
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what society views as a “woman” with what academia views as a “philosopher”. The habits of
each can become contradictory with women expected to be more passive and gentle than men,
while philosophers, having historically been men, have a more masculine expectation of being
aggressive and forward with their arguments. These two different habits or roles will combine in
various ways, as Sullivan (2001) states:
To be a woman philosopher is to have developed the conflicting habits of both a ‘good’
woman that politely defers to others by means of her bodily and verbal gestures and a
‘good’ philosopher whose bodily and verbal gestures are part of his aggressive
argumentation and defense of claims. (p. 106).
The conflict between the two opposing habits of this example has the potential to create friction
between this female philosopher and her colleagues or individuals in her personal life as they
may misunderstand certain habits of transacting that she has developed. Through the framework
of responsibility ethics, we would look at her behaviour within the context of the communities in
which she is a member and attempt to understand how her style of transacting has been
influenced by this. As a result of this, we can begin to assign responsibility on a more collective
scale as we recognize that these gendered habits of transacting are shaped by our collective
participation in performing them. We can thus acknowledge the ways these constructs have
either harmed or benefited her and those around her. Her contradictory actions arose from
contradictory gender constructs as opposed to some innate character flaw within this woman.
When we become aware of the reality of gender constructs, we can begin holding one another
responsible by opening dialogue and laying ground for critical examinations.
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Utilizing responsibility ethics within the context of STE in this way is important because
if “testing gendered habits outside of their context” is necessary to challenging gender binaries
then this will certainly create conflicts between different habits as they are pushed further and
further outside of their contexts. Responsibility ethics can provide us with the framework for
understanding and mediating these conflicts. When one is able to understand that the conflict has
emerged as a result of gender habits, this can encourage us to continue to question them and
learn how to accept them for what they are. This can be done most fruitfully when an ethics of
responsibility works alongside STE so that they may continually inform one another.
Regarding the cultivation of moral understanding amongst individuals, Walker (1998)
states that “these understandings may be fragile and temporary bridges, or they may settle into
firm common ground” (p. 202). Nonetheless, it is in the encouragement and attempt to reach
these understandings that there is hope as these understandings are the basis for responsibility
towards others. While we remain hopeful for this “firm common ground” to be reached through
understanding others’ beliefs and customs in the context of their environments, responsibility
ethics accounts for the fact that this is something that will not always be attained nor be obtained
easily. This supports Sullivan’s belief that improvements and positive change must be worked at
over long periods of time as challenging gender binaries is done with the hope of creating
understandings among individuals that “may settle into firm common ground”.
One way the stereotypes that emerge from rigid gender binaries can be harmful is in their
potential to create a self-fulfilling prophecy, in that all it takes for stereotypes to function is that a
person be aware of the stereotype’s existence (Walker, 1998, p. 196, 197). This is called
“stereotype vulnerability” and has been observed across studies which suggest that “stereotypes

Glover 40

may work directly in situations and interactions to alter behaviour and perception, not through
beliefs that embody or affirm them, but rather through beliefs that t he stereotypes exist.”
(Walker, 1998, p. 196, 197) The fact that other people believe stereotypes is enough to affect our
behaviour, which is rather alarming and lends support to Sullivan's urgency in needing to address
gender binaries. As Walker (1998) expresses, we can be held responsible in a multitude of ways
and at different levels, such as “specific tasks or goals” to “outcomes that are not ours alone, and
attitudes, habits, and traits.” (p. 94) When assessing the moral content of others actions we must
learn to also assess the extent to which society has criticized these actions as right or wrong and
on what basis. For example, is a woman really a “bitch” for being assertive? Or is she just
assuming a habit that is perfectly acceptable in men, and it is her gender and the context in which
she is acting that are responsible for this assessment? Examining responsibility ethics within STE
can provide us with a means for critical reflection when considering such problems.
It becomes essential that our habits influenced by gender binaries are assessed and
challenged. Responsibility ethics presents us with some tools to move towards this goal by
presenting us with a different way of understanding morality that attempts to account for these
concerns. In contrast, care ethics embraces gender binaries by promoting a theory of ethics that is
grounded in a stereotypical gendered perspective of woman as the caregiver. Responsibility
ethics can enrich STE better than care ethics can by encouraging critical self-reflection. In
addition, the ideas that an ethics of responsibility puts forward are more consistent with those of
STE by supporting the notion of a discursive transactional body. Even more importantly,
responsibility ethics and STE both aim to challenge rigid gender binaries and can together inform
one another and aid the reaching of this goal. Not only is it important that we address and
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challenge gender binaries, but through responsibility ethics, actually doing so can be described as
a moral responsibility we have for one another. For these reasons, responsibility ethics is better
suited than an ethics of care for enriching STE.
Conclusion: An ethics of responsibility can enrich STE.
To conclude, feminist ethical theories continue to evolve, as seen through care and
responsibility ethics, much as our understandings of ourselves and our environments continue to
change and evolve over time. As care ethics emerged to address the shortcomings of traditional
ethical theories, so too has responsibility ethics emerged as a broader understanding of ethics, in
the process addressing the shortcomings of care ethics. Ethics exists as a form of knowledge that
is continually evolving as we work out new ways of understanding ourselves and our
environments. As Sullivan (2001) states, “truth is not a matter of humans ‘fitting’ their beliefs to
the world. Nor is it a matter of matching internal representations to external reality. It is a mutual
negotiation and transformation of a relationship between humans and their environments” (p.
144). Ethics also possess this ability to evolve over time. As we have seen new ethical theories
arise, often in response to the criticisms or shortcomings of the theories that preceded them, we
will continue to see new theories arise that build upon responsibility ethics as well as other
ethical theories.
This constant evolution seems to find some stable ground through STE, on which we can
question, learn, and know about the world in a way that takes into account how humanity
changes through the notions of transaction and discourse. Sullivan acknowledges that this
transactional understanding of bodies is also a form of knowledge that will evolve over time as it
is cross-fertilized with other theories and built upon by other theorists. Understanding bodies as
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both transactional and discursive, and as such, existing in a constant state of “transaction” and
“change”, provides us with a means for making sense of this continual evolution. No
environment or individual exists in a static and unchanging state. For an ethical theory to enrich
STE it is essential for that theory to understand the person and their environments as mutually
constitutive of one another, so as to align with STE’s major tenets of understanding bodies as
transactional and discursive.
While care ethics and responsibility ethics both offer theories that agree with these major
tenets, an ethics of care falls short due to its reliance on a static and unchanging perspective.
Care ethics does take into account the need to address ethical issues on a situation by situation
basis and does not attempt to gain objectivity through its application of the maternal perspective;
however, this use of a single fixed perspective is one of the reasons that care ethics is ultimately
unsuccessful in contributing to STE. The role of change reveals that there can never be a single
maternal perspective that all mothers would agree is fully representative of their own. By relying
on a static perspective as the basis for its inquiry, care ethics is unable to accurately view people
as transactional and discursive.
Responsibility ethics moves beyond the problems of care ethics by providing a more
comprehensive view of the individual that doesn’t focus on or favour a particular “voice” or
point of view, but rather applies itself more generally and is thus better equipped to serve STE
than care ethics. Moral issues are still dealt with on a situation by situation basis, but the
perspective from which judgements are made is not predetermined at the outset of that inquiry as
it often has been within traditional ethical theories and care ethics. Rather, responsibility ethics
acknowledges that each individual will be making inquiries from their own perspective which
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has been influenced by their own experiences and environments and it is these individual
viewpoints that will determine the perspective from which judgements are made. From here a
greater appreciation can be given towards understanding the unique experiences and perspectives
of those whom we are considering for our inquiries. There is a sense of collaboration by which
the moral agent is not being judged by means of some perspective, whether that be an objective
“God’s eye” perspective or a maternal one, but rather by another person. Collaboration is present
in this sense as moral inquiry exists as a conversation that must take place by which each person
attempts to gain a mutual understanding of one another’s position. Because responsibility ethics
does away with the use of fixed perspective as the basis for its inquiry, responsibility ethics is
better suited than care ethics to enrich STE as it is able to accurately view people as transactional
and discursive.
Since Sullivan views gender binaries as in urgent need of attention, and the goal of this
paper is to enrich STE, it would follow that we address this binary itself as it exists within ethics
if that ethics is to in any way enrich STE. Care ethics was brought in as an alternative to “justice
thinking” in ethics which some criticized as favouring a ‘masculine’ point of view and way of
thinking. Yet, care ethics has also been similarly charged with favouring the ‘feminine’ point of
view and way of thinking by focusing on maternal thought. This shows exactly why the gender
binary needs urgent attention. In attempting to provide a “different voice”, care ethics instead
simply moves us from one end of the binary to the other.
What is required is a move away from an ethics that excludes women as well as an ethics
relevant primarily to women (not to mention only one possible aspect of woman’s identity),
towards an ethics that does not focus on one end of the binary, but rather attempts to operate
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outside of this binary while also accounting for it. In an effort to challenge and move beyond the
application of rigid gender binaries we must avoid theories that are responsible for perpetuating
this binary, such as we saw in traditional ethical theories, and later within care ethics. Rather
what is needed is an ethical theory that will take the progress that care ethics made in terms of
bringing attention to the private sphere of life, while moving past the use of a gendered
perspective that is supportive of unwanted gender stereotypes. We were able to find this within
responsibility ethics.
Responsibility ethics not only takes into account the evolving and ever-changing nature
of our existence by accurately viewing the individual as transactional and discursive, but it also
moves beyond the confines of rigid gender binaries as means for understanding the world.
Walker acknowledges that moral understanding must be in relation to an understanding of the
social and cultural context--or environments--in which one exists, which necessarily includes the
influence of gender constructs. As Walker (1998) stresses, “the single most important claim of
this book is that a lot of what we need in order to understand specifically moral judgements or
principles goes beyond specifically moral matters. We need to understand a social world.” (p.
203) Walker presents similar ideas to those found in care ethics in that we must look beyond
“specifically moral matters'', or in other words take into account more than the individuals
involved and the facts of the situation to include what Walker calls a “social world”. This social
world encompasses the “discursive and transactional body”. The social world can be described as
encompassing the current discourse and transactions that occur within a community without
separating the private and public spheres of life. In this way, an ethics of responsibility
compliments ideas found within STE.
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In addition to and because of this, we can discover how an ethics of responsibility can
enrich the epistemology of STE. Sullivan encourages the coming together of various theories in
service of similar goals while mutually enriching one another. As a result of this, responsibility
ethics helps to facilitate movement towards an important goal for Sullivan, which is to improve
transactions and thus improve bodily existence. This is done largely by addressing harmful and
oppressive constructs within society. Rigid gender binaries are an important construct which
Sullivan notes “requires great urgency”. Gender binaries continue to be sustained by habits that
have originated over time due to avoidance or lack of knowledge of the complex nature of the
person in transaction with their environments. Sullivan notes that habits indeed can be quite
difficult to change once established; however, there is always hope and potential for change.
A way these habits can be changed is by “making the ordinary seem strange” by
experiencing certain habits out of context, such as the example of the philosopher woman
(Sullivan, 2001, p. 105). Sullivan describes this in detail: “In subtle and often unconscious ways,
friction between these conflicting habits occurs virtually any time a woman philosopher transacts
with others, whether inside or outside the academy” (Sullivan, 2001, p. 106). This “can generate
ways of being gendered that slightly shake the sedimented masculine and feminine habits.”
(Sullivan, 2001, p. 106). Experiencing certain gendered habits outside of the types of
transactions that helped to form them can help to make us particularly aware of and ultimately
question the habit. Since care ethics rests on the notion of gendered habits (i.e. maternal care), it
would be unable to aid progress in the way that Sullivan describes.
Gendered habits outside of the contexts that formed them would still be assumed as
feminine or masculine within care ethics, and so there would arise a difficulty in truly breaking
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and challenging these habits. In contrast to this, responsibility ethics can work effectively
alongside STE to understand why that habit seems “out of place” when experienced in this
different way, and what harms or benefits these gendered habits might afford to those practicing
them and those encouraging or reinforcing them. In other words, responsibility ethics
complements STE in this goal of addressing and challenging gendered habits and thus the gender
binary.
It is Sullivan’s hope that this persistent form of challenging the binary will become useful
in learning to accept and eventually break these habits. Sullivan states that when a habit is
changed it must be replaced with a new one to take its place. An ethics of responsibility is useful
in moving towards this goal as it centralizes the social world and thus provides a means for
navigating morality that works to mediate gender binaries. Responsibility ethics helps to mediate
gender binaries by avoiding universal and abstract theory that is supposed to speak for all people
while also avoiding placing emphasis on any specific one perspective over another. It avoids
these problems by concentrating on the social world as a means of understanding moral
problems. Responsibility ethics can provide us with a framework for evaluating moral problems
and understanding the extent and content of our role in that evaluation, therefore, providing us
with a new moral theory to lean on as we break down the harmful habits originating from
traditional ethical theories as well as care ethics. It is for all these reasons that responsibility
ethics can operate alongside STE in such a way that is mutually informative and beneficial and
thus ultimately helps to enrich STE.
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